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In December of 1979, Willie Lloyd Turner, a Black man, was
tried in a Virginia state court for the murder of a white jewelry
store owner.' The jury found him guilty and sentenced him to
death.2 On appeal, Turner argued that his due process rights were
violated when the trial court judge refused the defense's request
that the following question be asked of all prospective jurors dur-
ing voir dire:3 "The defendant, Willie Lloyd Turner, is a member
* J.D. 1987, University of Minnesota.
1. Turner v. Commonwealth, 221 Va. 513, 518, 273 S.E.2d 36, 39 (1980), cert. de-
nied, 451 U.S. 1011 (1981). Turner was indicted in Southhampton County, Vir-
ginia, but was tried in Northhampton County, Virginia, after a motion for change
of venue was granted. Turner v. Bass, 753 F.2d 342, 343 n.1 (4th Cir. 1985), rev'd sub
nom. Turner v. Murray, 106 S. Ct. 1683 (1986).
2. Id. at 517, 273 S.E.2d at 39. Virginia law provides that the jury may impose
the death penalty if the defendant is found guilty of a capital offense and if the
Commonwealth has proved beyond a reasonable doubt that there is a probability
that the defendant "would commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a
continuing serious threat to society, or that his conduct in committing the offense
was outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman, in that it involved torture,
depravity of mind or aggravated battery to the victim." Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-
264.4(C) (1983). The sentence is imposed by the same jury which determined guilt
or innocence, see id. § 19.2-264.4(D), but a separate sentencing proceeding is held.
See id. § 19.2-264.4(A). At the sentencing proceeding, the jury may consider the cir-
cumstances of the offense, the history and background of the defendant, and any
mitigating facts admissible under the rules of evidence. Id. § 19.2-264.4(B). The
jury always retains the right to reject the death penalty regardless of the evidence
presented at the sentencing hearing. Smith v. Commonwealth, 219 Va. 455, 248
S.E.2d 135 (1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 967 (1979). If the jury recommends the
death penalty, the court then orders a postsentence report. After considering the
report, the court may set aside the death sentence and impose a sentence of life im-
prisonment if good cause is shown that the court should do so. Va. Code Ann.
§ 19.2-264.5.
3. Turner v. Commonwealth, 221 Va. at 522, 273 S.E.2d at 42. Voir dire is the
process by which jurors are chosen. Prospective jurors, sometimes called venire-
men, answer questions posed to them by the judge or the attorneys before trial.
Prospective jurors may be excused by either of two methods: challenge for cause or
peremptory challenge. Challenges for cause are based on a "narrowly specified,
provable and legally cognizable basis of partiality." Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202,
220 (1965). Peremptory challenges, fixed in number by statute, are exercised solely
Law and Inequality
of the Negro race. The victim, W. Jack Smith, Jr., was a white
Caucasian. Will these facts prejudice you against Willie Lloyd
Turner or affect your ability to render a fair and impartial verdict
based solely on the evidence?" 4
After losing his appeal to the Virginia Supreme Court,5 Tur-
ner petitioned the United States District Court for a writ of habeas
corpus.6 The District Court denied the petition,7 and Turner ap-
pealed. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
affirmed the denial of the petition, ruling that the trial court did
not commit "constitutional error" by refusing to ask prospective
jurors the requested voir dire question concerning racial bias.8
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.9 In a split
decision, the Supreme Court ruled that trial judges are required to
honor a defense request to ask a racial bias question in capital
cases involving an interracial crime. The Court vacated Turner's
death sentence, but refused to overturn his conviction.' 0
This comment will argue that the Supreme Court correctly
vacated Turner's sentence because the trial judge improperly re-
fused to question prospective jurors about potential racial bias.
The Court, however, should have gone further. The Court should
have reversed Turner's conviction and established a per se consti-
tutional rule requiring both state and federal trial judges, when re-
quested, to ask prospective jurors about racial bias in cases
by the attorneys. They ordinarily do not require any explanation. See id, at 217,
220. But see Batson v. Kentucky, 106 S. Ct. 1712 (1986).
4. Turner v. Commonwealth, 221 Va. at 522 n.8, 273 S.E.2d at 42 n.8. The judge
asked nine of the 15 questions requested by defense counsel.
5. Id. at 513, 273 S.E.2d at 36.
6. See Turner v. Bass, 753 F.2d 342, 343 n.1 (4th Cir. 1985), rev'd sub nom. Tur-
ner v. Murray, 106 S. Ct. 1683 (1986). Before petitioning the U.S. District Court,
Turner had filed a state habeas corpus petition which was denied. The U.S.
Supreme Court denied certiorari. Turner v. Morris, 462 U.S. 1112 (1983).
Turner filed his first petition for a federal writ of habeas corpus in the U.S.
District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia on July 27, 1983. The petition
was amended on March 20, 1984. See Turner v. Bass, 753 F.2d at 344.
7. The court denied the petition on May 23, 1984, and denied a motion to alter
that judgment on July 19, 1984. The court then issued a certificate of probable
cause, which allowed Turner to appeal to the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals. See
Turner v. Bass, 753 F.2d at 344.
8. Id. at 345-46. Turner raised a number of other claims on this appeal: that
the trial court was wrong in its determination that a prospective juror was abso-
lutely opposed to the death penalty and therefore subject to a challenge for cause;
that his trial counsel was ineffective in presenting Turner's psychiatric defense dur-
ing the sentencing phase of the trial; and that the vileness criterion of the Virginia
capital punishment statute was unconstitutional as applied to Turner. The Fourth
Circuit rejected all of Turner's claims. See id.
9. Turner v. Sielaff, 471 U.S. 1098 (1985).
10. Turner v. Murray, 106 S. Ct. 1683, 1688 (1986).
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involving a minority defendant accused of committing a violent
crime against a white victim.
II. Constitutional Background
In Virginia, as in the federal courts, the trial judge has discre-
tion in deciding whether prospective jurors will be questioned by
the judge, by the attorneys, or by both."1 A judge who decides to
conduct the entire voir dire alone usually asks counsel for each
side to submit a list of questions to be asked of the prospective ju-
rors. The judge often edits the questions, declining to ask some of
them, changing the language of others, and accepting some verba-
tim. In the Turner case, the judge rejected five of the fifteen ques-
tions offered by the defense, including the question concerning
potential racial prejudice.12 On appeal, the Fourth Circuit consid-
ered whether the judge's refusal to ask a racial bias question vio-
lated Turner's right to be tried by an impartial jury and whether
his right to due process under the sixth and fourteenth amend-
ments had been violated.13
A. Ristaino v. Ross
In its analysis of the Turner case, the Fourth Circuit relied
primarily upon Ristaino v. Ross, decided by the United States
Supreme Court in 1976.14 In Ristaino, the Court refused to re-
quire trial judges to question potential jurors about racial preju-
dice in every case in which a minority defendant is accused of a
violent offense against a white ictim.15 Ross, a Black male, was
tried by a jury in a Massachusetts state court for allegedly commit-
11. See Va. Sup. Ct. R. 3A.20(a); Turner v. Commonwealth, 221 Va. 513, 521, 273
S.E.2d 36, 41 (1980). See also Fed. R. Crim. P. 24(a). For a summary of voir dire
practices in state courts, see Jon Van Dyke, Jury Selection Procedures 282-84
(1977).
The American Bar Association recommends that "[t]he trial judge should con-
duct a preliminary voir dire examination. Counsel should then be permitted to
question panel members for a reasonable period of time." Standards Relating to
Juror Use and Management Standard 7(b) (1983) [hereinafter Standards].
12. Turner v. Commonwealth, 221 Va. at 522 n.8, 273 S.E.2d at 42 n.8.
13. See Turner v. Bass, 753 F.2d 342, 344 (4th Cir. 1985), rev'd sub nom. Turner
v. Murray, 106 S. Ct. 1683 (1986). The sixth amendment guarantees that "[in all
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial,
by an impartial jury." U.S. Const. amend. VI. The right is a due process right and
is therefore made binding on the states by the fourteenth amendment. See Irvin v.
Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 722 (1961). See also Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
14. 424 U.S. 589 (1976).
15. See id. at 597. For a lengthy discussion of U.S. Supreme Court cases con-
cerning a trial court's refusal to question prospective jurors concerning racial preju-
dice, see Steven J. Fram, Restricting Inquiry Into Racial Attitudes During Voir
Dire, 19 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 719 (1982).
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ting armed robbery, assault and battery with a dangerous weapon,
and assault and battery with intent to commit murder against a
white security guard at Boston University. 16 Ross's defense counsel
moved that the court ask prospective jurors about their racial bi-
ases and their possible relations with law enforcement personnel.17
The trial court refused to ask the racial bias question. In fact, the
trial court asked only the question concerning law enforcement
and a customary, general question concerning bias or prejudice.1S
Ross was convicted and appealed, alleging error in the trial
court's refusal to question prospective jurors about racial bias. The
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court rejected Ross's claim,19 but
the United States District Court granted a writ of habeas corpus
and the First Circuit affirmed.20
The United States Supreme Court reversed. 21 The Court
held that "the mere fact" that the victim of the alleged violent
crimes was white and the defendant was Black was not enough to
require that the trial court ask prospective jurors about racial
bias.22 Furthermore, the Court held that the circumstances of the
case did not suggest a significant likelihood that racial prejudice
might infect Ross's trial.23 Thus, the trial court's refusal to ask
about racial bias did not violate Ross's right to due process. None-
theless, the Court stated in a footnote that, although state trial
16. Ristaino, 424 U.S. at 590.
17. Id. The actual question requested by Ross was: "5. Are there any of you
who believe that a white person is more likely to be telling the truth than a black
person?" Id. at 590 n.1 (citing Appellant's Brief at 23).
18. Id. at 592. The clerk of court, rather than the judge, actually put the ques-
tions to the panel. The questions were stated as follows:
If any of you are related to the defendants or the victim, or if any
of you have any interest in this case, or have formed an opinion or is
sensible of any bias or prejudice, you should make it known to the
court at this time.
... Are you presently, or have you in the past worked for a police
department or a district attorney's office, or do you have any relative
who is or was engaged in such work.
Id. at 592 n.3.
19. Following his conviction, Ross first appealed to the Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court, which affirmed his conviction. Commonwealth v. Ross, 361 Mass.
665, 282 N.E.2d 70 (1972). The U.S. Supreme Court granted Ross's petition for writ
of certiorari and remanded for reconsideration in light of Ham v. South Carolina,
409 U.S. 524 (1973). Ross v. Massachussetts, 410 U.S. 901 (1973). The Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court again affirmed the conviction. Commonwealth v. Ross, 363
Mass. 665, 296 N.E.2d 810 (1973). Ross again sought certiorari, which the U.S.
Supreme Court denied. Ross v. Massachussetts, 414 U.S. 1080 (1973).
20. Ross v. Ristaino, 388 F. Supp. 99 (D. Mass. 1974), aff'd, 508 F.2d 754 (1st Cir.
1974), rev'd, 424 U.S. 589 (1976).
21. 424 U.S. at 589.
22. Id. at 597.
23. Id. at 598.
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courts were not constitutionally required to ask racial bias ques-
tions, the Court would exercise its supervisory power over the fed-
eral trial courts to require that the racial bias question be asked in
federal cases involving interracial crimes. 24
The Court thus laid down a minimal standard for jury selec-
tion in the state courts (based on the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment) and a more stringent rule for the federal
courts (based on federal supervisory powers). 25 The Fourth Cir-
cuit decided Turner under the Ristaino state court standard, and
held that the Virginia state court was not constitutionally required
to ask potential jurors about racial prejudice just because Turner
was Black and his alleged victim was white.26
B. Ham v. South Carolina
Turner argued that his case should be considered in light of
Ham v. South Carolina,2 7 a 1973 U.S. Supreme Court decision
which reversed the conviction of a Black civil rights organizer be-
cause the trial court refused to ask prospective jurors about racial
bias.2 8 Ham was convicted of possession of marijuana in a South
Carolina state court. He claimed that police officers had planted
the marijuana on him in response to his civil rights work.29 The
Supreme Court overturned Ham's conviction, finding that the trial
court's refusal to question prospective jurors about racial bias con-
stituted a violation of Ham's right to due process.30 In considering
24. Id. at 597, 597 n.9.
25. The Supreme Court further discussed the federal rule in Rosales-Lopez v.
United States, 451 U.S. 182 (1981). Rosales-Lopez, a Mexican resident alien, was
tried in federal court on a charge of transporting illegal aliens. The Supreme Court
upheld the trial court's refusal to ask prospective jurors the questions: "Would you
consider the race or Mexican descent of Humberto Rosales-Lopez in your evalua-
tion of this case? How would it affect you?" Id. at 185. Justice White, writing for
the plurality, held that the circumstances of the case did not raise a "reasonable
possibility" that racial or ethnic prejudice might influence the jury. One basis for
White's opinion, however, was that a question concerning aliens, which was asked
of all prospective jurors, must have been understood by the jurors to include Mexi-
can aliens, if not all people of Mexican background. Id. at 192-93. Justice White, in
dicta, added that a requested question on racial bias must always be asked in fed-
eral courts if the crime is a violent one involving a defendant and victim of differ-
ent social or ethnic backgrounds. Such a question might also have to be asked in
other cases where "external circumstances" indicate a reasonable possibility that
racial or ethnic prejudice might taint the verdict. Id. at 192.
26. Turner v. Bass, 753 F.2d 342, 344-46 (4th Cir. 1985), rev'd sub nom. Turner v.
Murray, 106 S. Ct. 1683 (1986).
27. 409 U.S. 524 (1973).
28. Id. at 529.
29. See id. at 525.
30. Id. at 529. Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion specifically limited the deci-
sion to the facts of the case, but failed to reveal which facts formed the basis for the
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Turner's case, the Fourth Circuit interpreted Ham in light of the
later Ristaino decision and concluded that Ham's civil rights activi-
ties had created "a fact specific situation in which racial issues
were 'inextricably bound up with the conduct of the trial.' "31
Therefore, the Fourth Circuit concluded that Ham was distin-
guishable from the Turner case because of the absence of specific
facts which would have injected a racial element into Turner's
trial.
C. Aldridge v. United States
The Fourth Circuit's Turner opinion did not cite Aldridge v.
United States.32 In Aldridge, a Black defendant was accused of
murdering a white policeman in the District of Columbia in 1929.
The trial judge refused to question prospective jurors about their
racial attitudes. 33 Aldridge was convicted and sentenced to death.
The Supreme Court, in an opinion by Chief Justice Hughes, re-
versed.34 Hughes's opinion cited no federal case law or constitu-
tional authority, and lower courts did not consider it an
interpretation of the Constitution.35 Nonetheless, the federal
courts read it as a broad requirement that potential jurors be ques-
tioned about racial bias in any case involving a Black defendant
and a white victim. 36 In 1973, the Eighth Circuit summarized the
Aldridge rule by stating, "For more than four decades, it has been
the rule in federal courts that a trial judge must inquire as to pos-
sible racial bias in the veniremen when the defendant is a member
decision. For a short discussion of the ambiguous nature of the Ham opinion and
the various interpretations of Ham by the state courts, see Fram, supra note 15, at
733-34.
31. Turner v. Bass, 753 F.2d 342, 345 (4th Cir. 1985), rev'd sub nom. Turner v.
Murray, 106 S. Ct. 1683 (1986) (quoting Ristaino v. Ross, 424 U.S. 589, 597 (1976)).
32. 47 F.2d 407 (D.C. Cir. 1931), rev'd, 283 U.S. 308 (1931).
33. 47 F.2d at 408.
34. 283 U.S. at 308.
35. In fact, Aldridge was not cited as constitutional authority in any opinion un-
til a South Carolina Supreme Court justice dissented in the Ham case. State v.
Ham, 256 S.C. 1, 12-13, 180 S.E.2d 628, 631-32 (1971) (Bussey, J., dissenting), rev'd
sub nom. Ham v. South Carolina, 409 U.S. 524 (1973).
36. See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 612 F.2d 735, 736-37 (3rd Cir. 1979) (re-
versing conviction for receiving firearms in interstate commerce), cert. denied, 445
U.S. 934 (1980); United States v. Booker, 480 F.2d 1310, 1311 (7th Cir. 1973) (revers-
ing narcotics conviction); United States v. Powers, 482 F.2d 941, 944 (8th Cir. 1973)
(affirming conviction for forgery and uttering worthless checks), cert. denied, 415
U.S. 923 (1974); United States v. Carter, 440 F.2d 1132, 1133-35 (6th Cir. 1971) (re-
versing bank robbery conviction); United States v. Gore, 435 F.2d 1110, 1113 (4th
Cir. 1970) (reversing conviction for possession of stolen property); King v. United
States, 362 F.2d 968, 969 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (reversing conviction for assault); Frasier




of a racial minority." 37 State courts, however, refused to embrace
the broad per se rule which developed in the federal courts after
Aldridge.38
In considering the Turner case, the Fourth Circuit thus began
with the notion that, under Ristaino, a state trial court is not per
se constitutionally required to ask potential jurors about racial bias
in every case in which a Black defendant is accused of a violent
crime against a white victim. The court presumed that such ques-
tioning was constitutionally required only when "special circum-
stances" suggested a significant likelihood that racial prejudice
might infect the trial.39
Turner made two arguments under this "special circum-
stances" doctrine. First, he argued that a charge of capital murder
constitutes a special circumstance in and of itself.40 Alternatively,
Turner argued that Blacks who murder whites are more likely
than other defendants to be sentenced to death, and that the in-
creased likelihood of the death penalty constitutes a special cir-
cumstance.41 The Fourth Circuit rejected both arguments.4 2
III. Turner v. Murray-The U.S. Supreme Court Decision
The U.S. Supreme Court reversed the Fourth Circuit and ac-
cepted Turner's argument that the possibility of a death sentence
creates a "special circumstance" under Ristaino.43 The Court held
that a defendant accused of an interracial capital crime is entitled
to have prospective jurors questioned on the issue of racial bias if
the defendant specifically requests such an inquiry.44 The defend-
ant is also entitled to have prospective jurors informed of the race
of the victim before they answer a racial bias question.45 In a split
37. Powers, 482 F.2d at 944 (emphasis in original).
38. See Fram, supra note 15, at 732, and cases cited therein. The federal rule
has since been modified by Rosales-Lopez v. United States, 451 U.S. 182 (1981). In-
quiry into racial prejudice is now required in federal courts if the case involves an
interracial crime or if external circumstances indicate a reasonable possibility that
racial or ethnic prejudice may influence the jury. See supra note 25.
39. Turner v. Bass, 753 F.2d 342, 345 (4th Cir. 1985), rev'd sub nom. Turner v.
Murray, 106 S. Ct. 1683 (1986).
40. 753 F.2d at 345.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Turner v. Murray, 106 S.Ct. 1683 (1986).
44. Id. at 1688.
45. Justice White notes in part I of his opinion that prospective jurors in this
case were not informed that the victim was white before they were asked whether
they could make an impartial judgement. Because the defendant was present dur-
ing voir dire, his race was known to prospective jurors. Id. at 1685.
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decision, the Court vacated Turner's death sentence. They refused,
however, to overturn his conviction.
Four Justices joined both part I of Justice White's plurality
opinion (which recited the facts and history of the case and an-
nounced reversal of the Fourth Circuit decision)46 and part III of
White's opinion (a paragraph announcing that a capital defendant
in an interracial crime is entitled to demand that prospective ju-
rors be asked about racial bias).47 Three Justices joined White in
part IV of his opinion, where he concluded that, although Turner's
death sentence must be vacated, Turner's conviction could stand.48
Chief Justice Burger concurred in the judgment but wrote no
opinion. 49 Justices Brennan and Marshall each wrote opinions
concurring in the decision to vacate the death sentence and dis-
senting from the decision to uphold the conviction.5 0 Justice Pow-
ell, joined by Justice Rehnquist, filed a dissent.51
Burger's refusal to author a concurrence created a problem in
defining the Court's majority opinion. Parts I and III of White's
opinion were clearly majority rulings. The sentence in part IV of
White's opinion which vacated Turner's sentence but upheld his
conviction was also a majority ruling. The question is how much,
if any, of the rest of White's writing in parts II and IV was a part
of the majority ruling in this case. Burger's vote was critical in de-
termining whether parts II and IV constituted part of the holding.
To the extent that Burger believed that parts II and IV were part
of "the judgment," his concurrence created a majority for White's
position. Burger must have objected to at least some of White's
writing in parts II and IV, however, or he would have joined in,
rather than concurred in, White's opinion.
In parts II and IV, White wrote that vacating Turner's sen-
tence was necessary because the discretion accorded the jury in
the sentencing decision created "a unique opportunity for racial
prejudice to operate but remain undetected,"52 and because the fi-
46. Id. at 1684.
47. Id. at 1688. The four Justices were Brennan, Blackmun, Stevens, and
O'Connor.
48. Id. The three Justices were Blackmun, Stevens, and O'Connor.
49. Id. at 1689 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
50. Id. at 1689, 1692 (Brennan, J. & Marshall, J., concurring in part, dissenting
in part). A total of seven Justices (White, Blackmun, O'Connor, Stevens, Burger,
Brennan, and Marshall) voted to vacate the death sentence.
51. Id. at 1693 (Powell, J. & Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Although Powell dis-
sented from the judgment of the Court, he clearly supported the majority opinion
to the extent that it upheld Turner's guilty verdict. Id. at 1694. A total of seven
Justices (White, Blackmun, O'Connor, Stevens, Burger, Powell, and Rehnquist)
voted to uphold the verdict.
52. Id. at 1687.
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nality of the death sentence made the risk of an incorrect verdict
unacceptable. White specifically reaffirmed the Court's decision in
Ristaino that the racial bias question need not be asked in noncap-
ital interracial crimes.53 It is impossible to tell whether these as-
sertions commanded Burger's approval, and thus represented the
opinion of the Court.
Justice Brennan would have overturned the conviction as
well as the sentence. He rejected White's contention that racial
prejudice was more likely to taint the sentencing decision. 54 Jus-
tice Marshall would have overruled Ristaino and established a per
se rule requiring that the racial bias question be asked in any case
involving an interracial crime.55
Justice Powell, writing in dissent, would have affirmed the
Fourth Circuit's decision and let Turner's death sentence stand.56
He argued that the record did not give any indication that racial
bias tainted the sentencing proceeding. In his view, the Court's
ruling amounted to a constitutional presumption that jurors in
capital cases were biased. He believed that the requirement that
jurors be questioned about racial bias would increase the number
of habeas corpus petitions by death row prisoners and would inject
the racial factor into capital trials. He felt that Virginia's proce-
dural and statutory safeguards against arbitrariness were
sufficient. 57
IV. Analysis
A. Capital Punishment Creates a Likelihood
of Racial Prejudice
Juries play a special role in death penalty cases because they
determine whether the ultimate fate of the defendant will be life
or death. In a trial to determine guilt, the issues are narrowly de-
fined. The prosecution attempts to prove that the defendant is
guilty of each specific element of the crime charged; the defense
attempts to show that the state has failed to prove each of those
elements beyond a reasonable doubt. Testimony is irrelevant if it
53. Id. at 1689. The Supreme Court has used its supervisory powers to require
that the question be asked in federal courts in all cases involving interracial crimes,
but have not extended the rule to the state courts. See supra note 25 and accompa-
nying text.
54. Id. at 1690 (Brennan, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
55. Id. at 1692-93 (Marshall, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). Brennan
joined Justice Marshall's opinion.
56. Id. at 1696 (Powell, J., dissenting). Justice Rehnquist joined Powell's
opinion.
57. Id. at 1693-96.
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does not tend to prove or disprove a specific element of the crime
charged. Most importantly, evidence concerning the defendant's
character is generally excluded unless the defendant "opens the
door" to his private history by testifying at trial.58 Evidence of the
defendant's character is excluded precisely because of the likeli-
hood that it will prejudice the jury. Although relevant to the de-
termination of guilt, evidence of the defendant's character is likely
to overwhelm other evidence and result in a jury verdict based
largely on the jury's reaction to the defendant as a person, rather
than the jury's consideration of evidence that a crime was commit-
ted and the defendant was the perpetrator.59 The creators of the
rules of evidence balanced the usefulness of character evidence
against the possibility that it would prejudice the jury. They ex-
cluded character evidence for two reasons: it is not highly relevant
in determining whether the defendant committed this particular
crime, and it is prejudicial because the jury is likely to give too
much weight to the character evidence, thus overwhelming more
relevant information.60
1. The jury's sentencing decision is largely subjective.
During the sentencing phase of a capital trial, however, the
defendant's character is at issue. Under the Virginia statutes
which governed Turner, for example, the jury may consider the
circumstances surrounding the offense, the history and back-
ground of the defendant, and any other facts in mitigation of the
offense.61 The death sentence may be imposed if the Common-
wealth proves beyond a reasonable doubt that there is a
probability, based on the circumstances of the crime and the de-
58. See, e.g., Fed. R. Evid. 404.
59. See 1A John H. Wigmore, Evidence § 58.2 (Peter Tillers rev. 1983).
60. See Fed. R. Evid. 403-04 advisory committee's notes.
61. Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-264.4(B) (1983). Statutes of this kind are sometimes
referred to as "guided discretion" statutes. The U.S. Supreme Court declared state
death penalty statutes unconstitutional in 1972, in large part because they allowed
the jury unguided discretion in determining which defendants should be put to
death. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972). In 1976, after states rewrote their
statutes, the Court rejected mandatory death penalties because they do not provide
for "individualized" justice. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 303 (1976).
The Court, however, approved statutes which guided the jurors' discretion by re-
quiring that they consider aggravating and/or mitigating circumstances. Gregg v.
Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 206-07 (1976).
For an argument that the "guided discretion" statutes have failed to correct the
arbitrary nature of capital punishment decisions, see William J. Bowers & Glenn L.
Pierce, Arbitrariness and Discrimination Under Post-Furman Capital Statutes, 26
Crime & Delinq. 563 (1980). For an analysis of the types of limits various states
have placed upon their sentencing authorities, see Note, Discretion and the Consti-
tutionality of the New Death Penalty Statutes, 87 Harv. L. Rev. 1690 (1974).
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fendant's prior history, that the defendant would commit criminal
acts of violence that would constitute a continuing serious threat
to society. 62 Alternatively, the death penalty may be imposed if
the Commonwealth proves that the offense was "outrageously or
wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman, in that it involved torture, de-
pravity of mind or aggravated battery to the victim."6 3 Even if one
or more of these conditions is proven beyond a reasonable doubt,
however, the jury is still at liberty to impose life imprisonment
rather than the death penalty.64
Essentially, a defendant convicted of a capital offense must
throw himself upon the mercy of the jury. As stated above, the
jury considers the circumstances of the offense, the history and
background of the defendant, and any evidence of mitigating fac-
tors presented by defense counsel.65 The Virginia capital punish-
ment statute gives juries no guidance as to the weight they should
give each of these considerations. Although the statute encourages
the jury to look at the circumstances of the crime and the defend-
ant's background, the jury's ultimate task is to answer a very sub-
jective question: Is there a probability that this defendant will
endanger the community by committing violent crimes in the fu-
ture? If it answers that question in the affirmative, or if it finds
that the offense was "outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or in-
human," the jury presumably must ask itself another subjective
question: Is death the appropriate penalty for this defendant?66
62. Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-264.4(C) (1983).
63. Id.
64. Smith v. Commonwealth, 219 Va. 455, 248 S.E.2d 135 (1978), cert. denied, 441
U.S. 967 (1979).
65. Defense counsel's presentation of evidence is subject to the admissibility
provisions of the Virginia rules of evidence. Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-264.4(B) (1983).
66. Although this question is never actually put to the jury, it is raised by the
structure of the Virginia capital punishment statute. A jury which finds that the
defendant would endanger the community by committing future acts of criminal vi-
olence may nonetheless give life imprisonment rather than death. See Smith, 219
Va. at 479, 248 S.E.2d at 151. The jury must decide whether to be lenient in spite of
the evidence. In addition, the jury is confronted with a logical problem. If they
find that the defendant will be a continuing danger to the community, the obvious
solution is to separate the defendant from the community by imprisoning him for
life. There are only three theories which rationally support the use of the death
penalty to separate the defendant from society. The first is the possibility that the
defendant will escape or will be paroled, and will thereby reenter society. The sec-
ond is that the defendant will commit violent crimes against fellow prisoners. The
third is that death and life imprisonment are functionally equivalent (both separate
the defendant from society), and death is preferable because it saves society the
cost of life imprisonment. While the first theory may be a valid consideration, the
jury is given no information on the frequency of escape or parole, and is therefore
unable to make an intelligent decision. The third theory, in the author's view at
least, is patently unacceptable in any modern democracy.
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The decision necessarily relies heavily on the jury's evalua-
tion of the moral worth, or potential, of the defendant as a person.
The jury evaluates the defendant's capacity to improve himself
and balances that capacity (if they find that it exists at all) against
society's interest in retribution, incapacitation of the defendant,
and deterrence of future crime. 67 This determination is likely to
be profoundly influenced if jurors hold significant racial biases.68
The determination raises issues which cut to the heart of racial
prejudice: the relative importance of separating the (Black) de-
fendant from (the predominantly white) society, the inhumanity of
the killing of this (white) victim by this (Black) defendant,69 the
existence of an intellectual and moral ability within the (Black)
defendant to understand that (white) society's values are correct,70
and the willingness of the (Black) defendant to reject his connec-
tions with the (Black) criminal underclass in order to accept the
values of (white) society. When the defendant is Black and has
more often than not grown up in an environment which is poor
67. The theory of general deterrence holds that punishment inflicted on a crim-
inal will deter others from committing crimes in the future. Wayne LaFave & Aus-
tin Scott, Jr., Criminal Law 24 (2d ed. 1986). The theory of particular, or specific,
deterrence aims to deter the criminal himself from committing future crimes. Id. at
23.
68. The same can be said of biases based on religion, gender, etc.
69. In their famous study, The American Jury, Harry Kalven and Hans Zeisel
questioned 1,191 juries throughout the United States and found that the juries were
sympathetic to 22% of white defendants, but were sympathetic to only 13% of Black
defendants. Conversely, juries had highly unfavorable reactions to 20% of Black
defendants, while only 16% of white defendants created unfavorable impressions.
Harry Kalven & Hans Zeisel, The American Jury 211 (1971). Sympathy is a major
factor in jury leniency. Id. at 212, 343-44. See also infra notes 73-75, 84-90 and ac-
companying text.
70. Kalven and Zeisel quote the observations of judges who are trying to ex-
plain jury verdicts with which they disagree:
Negroes are not held to the same moral responsibility as white
people.... Community regards the law as too severe for some Negro
cases because of the lack of moral sense.
Our juries are loathe to hold colored people to as high standards
as white people.
[The lenient jury verdict was] [p]robably because of the fact that
defendant and his wife were illiterate Negroes and the jury did not
feel like holding the defendant to the same responsibility as it would a
white man under the circumstances.
Kalven & Zeisel, supra note 69, at 340-41.
This condescending view of the moral and intellectual abilities of Blacks is not
confined to juries. One judge explained that a jury's finding of first degree murder
was fully supported by the evidence, but that he would have found only second de-
gree murder because "[t]he ancestors of this defendant came from the jungle of Af-
rica only a few generations ago. Society expected too much from him. He killed the
woman because he had insufficient intelligence to solve his problem any other
way." Id. at 343.
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and Black, and the jurors are predominantly white, jurors are
likely to have difficulty envisioning the defendant as a viable part
of society.7 1
If jurors assume that the alternative to the death sentence is
life imprisonment, and that the defendant is unlikely to escape or
be paroled, they must then ask themselves whether the defendant
could live a worthwhile life in jail, and must balance the potential
for a worthwhile life against society's interests. The jury will also
ask itself whether "good people" (like themselves) should have to
pay the cost of imprisoning for life a defendant who will almost
certainly never make any positive contribution to society. In es-
sence, the jury is asked to balance the moral worth of a Black
criminal, who is likely to be both poor and uneducated, against,
among other things, the extent to which society demands retribu-
tion for a violent crime against a white victim and deterrence of
similar offenses.
A predominantly white jury is unlikely to be able to put itself
in the shoes of a Black defendant who may have committed crimes
throughout his life, especially if individual jurors harbor any
prejudices against Blacks in general.72 On the other hand, the jury
may find it very easy to put itself in the place of the white victim
of the violent crime, and may be able to "feel," to a much greater
extent, the suffering of the victim, the effect of the crime on the
victim's friends and relatives, and the fear engendered in the com-
munity that similar crimes might be directed against them.7 3 The
jury's empathy for the white victim of a violent crime may lead
71. The President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of
Justice, in a study of the courts conducted in the middle 1960's, concluded that
many defendants are not understood by and seem threatening to the
court and its officers. Even such simple matters as dress, speech, and
manners may be misinterpreted. Most city prosecutors and judges
have middle-class backgrounds and a high degree of education. When
they are confronted with a poor, uneducated defendant, they may have
difficulty judging how he fits into his own society or culture. They can
easily mistake a certain manner of dress or speech, alien or repugnant
to them but ordinary enough in the defendant's world, as an index of
moral worthlessness.
Task Force on Admin. of Justice, President's Commission on Law Enforcement &
Admin. of Justice, Task Force Report: The Courts 50 (1967). Certainly jurors expe-
rience similar problems in evaluating defendants. If jurors are unable to determine
how well the defendant fit into his past environment, they will also have trouble
predicting the likelihood that the defendant would be able to adopt and follow the
values of the majority society.
72. See supra note 69.
73. Kalven and Zeisel suggest that juries may tend to be more lenient to the
defendant in cases where the victim is Black because they may believe that violent
crime is more normal (and therefore more acceptable) in minority communities.
Kalven & Zeisel, supra note 69, at 341.
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them to impose the death sentence without giving full and fair
consideration to the defendant.7 4 At the very least, it may lead ju-
ries to impose the death penalty more frequently when the victim
is white (regardless of the race of the defendant), because they
have more empathy for a white victim than for a Black victim.
7 5
Similarly, juries may impose the death penalty more frequently
against Black defendants (for whom they have less understanding)
than against white defendants.7 6
2. Evidence shows that racial bias affects the sentencing
decision in capital cases.
The Supreme Court was correct in concluding that racial bias
is more likely to infect the sentencing phase of the trial than the
verdict phase.7 7 Justice Brennan was wrong to argue to the con-
trary.78 The sentencing decision is highly subjective and, there-
fore, highly likely to be influenced by unexpressed (and perhaps
even unacknowledged) racial prejudices. 79
In his appeal to the Fourth Circuit, Turner claimed that
Blacks who kill whites are more likely to be sentenced to death,
and that this fact creates a "special circumstance."80 The Fourth
Circuit rejected that contention, specifically holding that "the fact
that a larger percentage of white victims' assailants are executed
74. The U.S. Supreme Court has stated that the personal characteristics of the
victim and the emotional impact of the crime are irrelevant to the capital sentenc-
ing decision. Accordingly, the Court has struck down the use of victim impact
statements in capital sentencing because the statements create "a constitutionally
unacceptable risk that the jury may impose the death penalty in an arbitrary and
capricious manner." Booth v. Maryland, 107 S. Ct. 2529, 2533 (1987).
75. Kalven and Zeisel quote a judge's explanation for a jury's decision not to
impose the death penalty for the murder of a Black woman: "A Negro killing a Ne-
gro, that is, the jury did not attach enough importance to the value of a human life
due to race." Id. at 442. Another judge, asked to give an explanation for a not
guilty verdict in a homicide case, responded: "None, except the parties were both
Indians and jurors can't get excited about the fact one Indian kills another Indian."
Id. at 341. A third judge explained a not guilty verdict this way: "If [the victim] had
been a white man he would have been convicted. Negroes [defendants] in cases of
this type receive more than equal rights; juries seem to think it's okay for them to
cut, if it's another colored person that is cut." Id. at 341.
76. See supra note 69. See also Samuel R. Gross, Race and Death: The Judicial
Evaluation of Evidence of Discrimination in Capital Sentencing, 18 U.C. Davis L.
Rev. 1275, 1281 (1985).
77. Turner v. Murray, 106 S. Ct. 1683, 1688-89 (1986).
78. See id. at 1690 (Brennan, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
79. This Comment will argue, moreover, that the likelihood of racial prejudice
at the verdict stage of trial is also sufficient to justify a per se rule requiring that
the racial bias question be asked in all cases of interracial crime.
80. Turner v. Bass, 753 F.2d 342, 345 (4th Cir. 1985), rev'd sub nom. Turner v.
Murray, 106 S. Ct. 1683 (1986).
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than are other races is not a special circumstance."1 The Supreme
Court, having already decided to vacate Turner's sentence, did not
reach the issue.8 2
During earlier argument before the Virginia Supreme Court,
Turner introduced a study indicating that Blacks who kill whites
are more likely to be given the death penalty. Because the study
was based on statistics from states other than Virginia, the Vir-
ginia court found that it was not useful to show potential prejudice
in this case.8 3
Two recently published studies by Professors David Baldus,
Charles Polaski, and George Woodworth support Turner's position
and confirm the fear that capital juries are generally biased
against Black defendants who kill whites.8 4 The Procedural Re-
form Study covered 594 defendants convicted of murder and sen-
tenced to death in Georgia between March 1973 and June 1978.85
The Charging and Sentencing Study covered 1066 homicide prose-
cutions in Georgia between 1973 and 1980.86 Both studies ac-
counted for more than 200 variables which might affect both
verdicts and sentences, and the Charging and Sentencing Study
also accounted for the effects of plea-bargaining and convictions
for the lesser included offense of manslaughter.8 7 Thus, the stud-
ies demonstrate general prejudice without regard for the details of
particular cases. The studies found that killers of whites were 4.3
times as likely to be sentenced to death as killers of Blacks.88 The
studies also found evidence of discrimination based on the race of
the defendant. 89 A number of other studies by different research-
ers using a variety of techniques have reached similar results.90
81. Id.
82. Turner v. Murray, 106 S. Ct. at 1689 n.1l.
83. Turner v. Commonwealth, 221 Va. 513, 523 n.9, 273 S.E.2d 36, 42 n.9 (1980),
cert. denied, 451 U.S. 1011 (1981).
84. David Baldus, Charles Pulaski & George Woodworth, Comparative Review
of Death Sentences: An Empirical Study of the Georgia Experience, 74 J. Crim. L.
& Criminology 661 (1983) [hereinafter Charging & Sentencing Study]; David
Baldus, Charles Pulaski & George Woodworth, Monitoring and Evaluating Con-
temporary Death Sentencing Systems: Lessons from Georgia, 18 U.C. Davis L. Rev.
1375 (1985) [hereinafter Procedural Reform Study]. For an extensive judicial dis-
cussion of the Baldus studies, see McCleskey v. Kemp, 107 S. Ct. 1756 (1987). See
also Gross, supra note 76, at 1275.
85. McCleskey v. Zant, 580 F. Supp. 338, 353-55 (N.D. Ga. 1984), rev'd on other
grounds sub nom. McCleskey v. Kemp, 753 F.2d 877 (11th Cir. 1985) (en banc),
aff'd, 107 S. Ct. 1756 (1987).
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. McCleskey v. Kemp, 753 F.2d at 897.
89. Gross, supra note 76, at 1281.
90. See Murderers of Whites More Likely to be Put to Death, Paper Says, Min-
neapolis Star & Trib., Nov. 17, 1985, at 10B, col. 1. In 25 of the 32 states which have
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The Fourth Circuit focused on the particular circumstances
of the Turner case. Under Ristaino, prospective jurors must be
asked about racial prejudice if special circumstances suggest a sig-
nificant likelihood that racial prejudice might infect the trial.91 By
restricting their inquiry to the circumstances of the offense, the
Fourth Circuit justified its decision denying Turner relief by point-
ing out that racial motivations were not involved in the commis-
sion of the murder itself or in Turner's arrest.92 The Supreme
Court correctly concluded that the Fourth Circuit's restricted in-
quiry was inadequate. 93 The real issue was whether there were
special circumstances inherent in the trial which injected a racial
element into the case. Special circumstances may be the result of
a racial element in the circumstances of the crime itself, a defense
which involves a racial issue,94 or a racial disparity resulting from
the operation of the judicial process. The prosecution did not
claim that the killing Turner was accused of committing was ra-
cially motivated, and Turner did not argue a defense which in-
volved race. Rather, Turner claimed that the judicial process itself
was tainted because jurors are more likely to give the death sen-
tence to Blacks accused of killing whites than to other defendants.
The alleged Black-against-white capital crime, in and of itself, cre-
a death penalty (including Virginia), the Dallas Times Herald found that a consis-
tent pattern existed whereby those who killed whites were nearly three times as
likely to be sentenced to death as those who killed Blacks. When Blacks are ac-
cused of killing white victims, the disparity is even greater. The most extreme ex-
ample is Texas, where a white who kills a white is 12 times more likely to be
sentenced to death than a white who kills a Black. Of the current death row in-
mates whose crimes were committed between January 1977 and December 1984,
1,265 killed whites and 212 killed Blacks. Since the United States Supreme Court
reaffirmed the constitutionality of the death penalty in 1976, no white has been ex-
ecuted for killing a Black. Thirteen Blacks have been executed for killing whites.
The Times Herald study seems to indicate that racial disparity in capital sentencing
is the result of general racial prejudice among the jurors who make the sentencing
decision. The Times Herald study involved all murders between January 1977 and
December 1984 in states which have a death penalty. The study probably underes-
timates the effect of racial bias because it counts Hispanics as white in order to con-
form with FBI data prior to 1980.
See also Marvin Wolfgang & Marc Riedel, Rape, Race, and the Death Penalty
in Georgia, 45 Am. J. Orthopsychiatry 658 (1975); Rupert Koeninger, Capital Pun-
ishment in Texas 1924-1968, 15 Crime & Delinq. 132 (1969); Bowers & Pierce, supra
note 61, at 563.
91. Ristaino v. Ross, 424 U.S. 589, 598 (1976).
92. See Turner v. Bass, 753 F.2d 342, 345 (4th Cir. 1985), rev'd sub nom. Turner
v. Murray, 106 S. Ct. 1683 (1986).
93. The Supreme Court broadened the inquiry to include a circumstance of the
trial itself: the higher level of discretion exercised by the jury in the sentencing
portion of the trial. Turner v. Murray, 106 S. Ct. at 1687.
94. In Ham v. South Carolina, for instance, Ham alleged as a defense that he




ates a special circumstance. Studies confirming that Blacks who
kill whites are far more likely to be put to death than other de-
fendants suggest, at the very least, that there is "a significant like-
lihood that racial prejudice might infect (defendant's) trial."95
Faced with evidence that the jury selection process, a func-
tion of the judicial system itself, creates serious inequities in the
area of capital cases involving cross-racial crime, 96 courts bear a
special responsibility to remedy this flaw in the system. The
courts' exalted standing in United States society flows directly
from the notion that decisions are made by impartial fact-finders.
Fundamental fairness is the highest attribute of our legal system
and the justification for its continued existence. When the fairness
of a legal process is called into question, the courts must do all that
is reasonable to assure both actual fairness and the appearance of
fairness. Racial bias, like perjury and tampering with a witness,
taints the entire judicial process with the possibility of an errone-
ous verdict. 97
The justification for the requirement of special circumstances
is the belief that a racial motive or a race-related defense are
likely to bring to the surface any hidden bias within the jury.98
The studies which chart the sentencing disparity in Black-against-
white capital crimes strongly suggest that latent racial biases affect
the trial even in the absence of a race-related motive or race-re-
lated defense. 99 Because of that disparity, "special circumstances"
are inherent in any capital case involving a Black defendant and a
white victim. In such a case, a judge should always grant a defense
95. Ristaino v. Ross, 424 U.S. at 598. But see McCleskey v. Kemp, 107 S. Ct.
1756 (1987) (likelihood of racial prejudice shown by the Baldus studies did not rise
to the constitutional measure of an unnacceptable risk of racial prejudice).
96. See, e.g., Bowers & Pierce, supra note 61, at 563. Bowers and Pierce studied
capital punishment in Florida, Georgia, Texas, and Ohio, the states which were re-
sponsible for approximately 70% of the death penalties imposed in the five years
following the 1972 Furman decision. The study found that
there are gross differences in the treatment of potentially capital of-
fenders by race of offender and victim and by judicial circuits within
states. These are (1) independent of aggravating felony-related cir-
cumstances, (2) present at both presentencing and sentencing stages of
the criminal justice process, (3) uncorrected by the postsentencing ap-
pellate review process, (4) unaltered by the form and restrictiveness of
capital statutes among states, and (5) remarkably similar to the best
documented patterns of differential treatment by race of offender and
victim under pre-Furman capital statutes, now ruled unconstitutional.
Id. See also Charging & Sentencing Study, supra note 84, at 661; Procedural Re-
form Study, supra note 84, at 1375. But see McCleskey, 107 S. Ct. at 1756.
97. See Aldridge v. United States, 283 U.S. 308 (1931).
98. See Ham v. South Carolina, 409 U.S. 524 (1973). For further discussion of
Ham, see Ristaino v. Ross, 424 U.S. at 596-97.
99. See supra notes 84-90 and accompanying text. See also supra note 96.
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request that jurors be questioned about racial bias. Therefore, the
Supreme Court's decision to invalidate Turner's death sentence
was unassailably correct.
B. The Supreme Court Should Have Adopted a Per Se
Rule Requiring Trial Courts to Grant Defense
Requests for Questioning About Racial Bias
in All Cases Involving a Minority
Defendant and a White Victim.
It is well known that prejudices often exist against particular
classes in the community, which sway the judgment of jurors,
and which, therefore, operate in some cases to deny to persons
of those classes the full enjoyment of that protection which
others enjoy.1 00
In essence, the right to jury trial guarantees to the criminally
accused a fair trial by a panel of impartial, "indifferent" jurors.
The failure to accord an accused a fair hearing violates even
the minimal standards of due process. 1° 1
The purpose of voir dire is the selection of an impartial jury.
Juries are expected to make their decisions solely on the basis of
the evidence presented at trial. For this reason, courts zealously
protect juries against outside influences such as television news
shows and comments by bailiffs. Juries are admonished not to talk
about the case with others and not to undertake any independent
investigation of the facts of the case. To guard against possible con-
tamination of the verdict by extrinsic information, courts may lock
juries in deliberation rooms, house jurors together in a hotel over-
night, and assign bailiffs to make sure that jurors have no contact
with outside influences. 102
The elimination of prejudicial intrinsic influences presents
courts with a tougher chore. Voir dire is designed to expose in-
trinsic influences-biases contained within the minds of potential
jurors-which may unfairly prejudice the outcome of the trial.
Thus, jurors are commonly excused if they believe all defendants
are guilty or if they believe that particular punishments (e.g., the
death penalty) are never appropriate. 0 3
Racial discrimination is a more subtle form of intrinsic bias
than those mentioned above, but it is every bit as likely to affect
the jury's eventual verdict. Potential jurors who refuse to accept
the "rules of the game"-the presumption of innocence, the assign-
100. Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 309 (1880).
101. Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 722 (1961).
102. See generally 75 Am. Jur. 2d Trial §§ 945-1010 (1974). See also Mattox v.
United States, 146 U.S. 140, 149-50 (1892).
103. See, e.g., Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968).
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ment of certain penalties to certain crimes, etc.-are discovered
relatively easily and dismissed for cause. Furthermore, those few
who may slip through voir dire are reminded during the trial of
their solemn duty to follow the law as given to them by the judge
in the instructions. Judges include such admonitions in jury in-
structions after the presentation of evidence, 10 4 and attorneys
often use them in closing statements.
Racial bias, on the other hand, is generally a subject which
can only be addressed during voir dire. Courts are sometimes re-
luctant to instruct juries not to be swayed by racial prejudice in
reaching their decision.10 5 A defense attorney runs the risk of
bringing out latent racial prejudice among jurors if he specifically
addresses the problem of potential racial prejudice in his closing
statement. Thus, the trial court has a special duty to discover and
eliminate racially biased jurors precisely because racial prejudice
among jurors is a problem which cannot effectively be minimized
by jury instructions or closing arguments.
The conceptual basis for the "special circumstances" require-
ment is the notion that a potential juror's racial bias will be
brought into play by the circumstances of the case. This view of
jury behavior presumes that there is little chance that a juror's ra-
cial bias will affect the verdict unless the catalyst of "special cir-
cumstances" is present to taint the decision-making process. As
Justice Stevens has pointed out, however, racial bias may be a spe-
cial prejudice against the defendant which is not dependent on the
facts of the case. 106 A KKK member may be as likely to convict a
Black for shoplifting as to convict a Black for shooting a white
man to death.
The Supreme Court has been unwilling to lay down a per se
rule requiring judges to question potential jurors concerning racial
prejudice for fear of injecting a racial element into a case where
race should not be a factor.10 7 According to this theory, a question
from the judge regarding racial bias might be interpreted by pro-
spective jurors as a signal that race should be a factor in their con-
sideration of the case. Thus, well-intentioned trial judges might
104. See, e.g., Committee on Federal Jury Instructions of the Seventh Circuit,
Federal Criminal Jury Instructions of the Seventh Circuit 1.01 (1980); 10 Minn.
Practice 3.01 (2d ed. 1985) (Criminal Jury Instructions).
105. Some judges seem to feel that a court, in raising the possibility that racial
bias may be present, unneccesarily undermines confidence in our system of justice
by injecting the racial bias issue into the trial. See, e.g., Ristaino v. Ross, 424 U.S.
589, 596 n.8 (1976); Rosales-Lopez v. United States, 451 U.S. 182, 190-91 (1981). See
also Fram, supra note 15.
106. Rosales-Lopez, 451 U.S. at 196, 197 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
107. See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
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refuse to ask a racial bias question because they conclude that it is
likely to inject, rather than exclude, racial bias as a factor in the
jury's decision.O8
The flaw in this reasoning is obvious. The question concern-
ing racial bias need not be asked unless it is requested by the de-
fense counsel. Without a defense request, the trial judge need not
decide whether the question is constitutionally required. Defense
counsel will not request that the judge ask the voir dire question
unless counsel believes that the question will serve the defendant's
interest. If defense counsel decides that the chances of uncovering
a biased juror are slim and that the racial element may be injected
into the case to the defendant's detriment, counsel will simply not
request that the judge ask the question. Surely the decision should
rest with the defense counsel, whose sole function is to protect the
interests of the defendant at trial. Defense counsel is in a better
position to represent the defendant than the trial judge.109
Another argument against a per se rule is that the rule
amounts to a constitutional presumption that jurors are racially bi-
ased.11o The concern is not prejudice against the defendant, but
rather the danger that acknowledging the possibility that racial
bias may influence verdicts will undermine confidence in the
courts. The argument overemphasizes the importance of the ap-
pearance that courts are fair, and de-emphasizes the importance of
actual fairness to the defendant. The U.S. Supreme Court's dis-
cussion of "fairness" in Aldridge v. United States 111 clearly states
the proper balance between the court's interest in its image and its
responsibility to insure the defendant a fair trial:
The argument is advanced on behalf of the Government
that it would be detrimental to the administration of the law
in the courts of the United States to allow questions to jurors
as to racial or religious prejudices. We think that it would be
far more injurious to permit it to be thought that persons en-
tertaining a disqualifying prejudice were allowed to serve as
jurors and that inquiries designed to elicit the fact of disquali-
fication were barred. No surer way could be devised to bring
the processes of justice into disrepute.112
A third argument against a per se rule is that trial judges are
traditionally given broad discretion in conducting voir dire.113
108. See Rosales-Lopez, 451 U.S. at 190-91.
109. See Turner v. Murray, 106 S. Ct. 1683, 1688 n.10 (1986).
110. Id. at 1697 (Powell, J., dissenting); Ristaino v. Ross, 424 U.S. 589, 596 n.8
(1976).
111. 283 U.S. 308 (1931).
112. Id. at 314-15, quoted in Rosales-Lopez, 451 U.S. at 191.
113. See, e.g., Ham v. South Carolina, 409 U.S. 524, 527 (1973). The federal ap-
peals courts will not overturn a guilty verdict absent both an "abuse of [the judge's]
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This broad discretion is said to be justified by the trial judge's op-
portunity to observe the demeanor of potential jurors. The deci-
sion whether to ask about racial bias, however, is based on the
circumstances of the case, not the responses or demeanor of indi-
vidual jurors. Therefore, under a "special circumstances" rule, the
theory justifying broad judicial discretion breaks down.
Presumably, the existence of "special circumstances" is deter-
mined by the facts of the case. The trial judge must review the
facts of the case with an eye toward factors which might inject a
racial element into the trial: whether the crime is committed by a
member of one race against a victim of another race; whether the
circumstances include any expression of racial hatred by the de-
fendant or victim; whether racial enmity is an element of a de-
fense or justification (e.g., heat of passion); and whether defendant
has engaged in race-related activities which are in some way con-
nected to the charge or the defense. 114
In reviewing the facts of a case which he has not yet heard,
the trial judge is necessarily constrained by the information avail-
able to him. He has not yet heard witnesses and does not have the
benefit of observing their demeanor. His knowledge of physical
evidence, exhibits, confessions and admissions, other crimes alleg-
edly committed by the defendant, and evidence of defense or justi-
fication is limited to his exposure to that evidence during pretrial
hearings on admissibility. In a jurisdiction where pretrial hearings
are routinely heard by a judge other than the trial judge, the trial
judge may have very little knowledge of the facts of the case at the
time of voir dire. Most important, the trial judge may know very
little about defense strategy, which may change during the trial.
The appellate court, on the other hand, can use the trial tran-
script in determining whether "special circumstances" injected a
racial element into the case. 115 Given the fact that a judge may
broad discretion, and a showing that the rights of the accused have been substan-
tially prejudiced thereby." United States v. Robinson, 475 F.2d 376, 380 (D.C. Cir.
1973). Under Robinson, trial judges are said to abuse their discretion if they refuse
to ask requested questions concerning prejudice which is common in the commu-
nity. Id. at 381. Is this standard adequate? Should a defendant be denied an oppor-
tunity to discover a biased juror simply because the community, taken as a whole,
does not share that bias? See People v. Williams, 29 Cal. 3d 392, 413-14, 628 P.2d
869, 881, 174 Cal. Rptr. 317, 328-29 (1981) (Bird, C.J., concurring).
114. The best example of the last factor is Ham v. South Carolina, 409 U.S. at
525. Ham claimed that the police framed him in retaliation for his civil rights
activities.
115. The argument can be made that an appellate standard of review which does
not accord broad discretion to the trial judge would result in a greater number of
verdicts overturned because of juror bias. One must remember, however, that the
remedy in these cases is a new trial. The present system provides for greater pre-
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know very little about the case before trial begins, it seems reason-
able to allow the appellate court to use the full trial court record
as a basis for review of the necessity for asking a question concern-
ing racial bias.
Fourth, some courts have argued that the racial bias question
is unnecessary because general questions, which ask prospective
jurors whether any specific attitudes or knowledge they hold may
prevent them from rendering a fair verdict based solely on the evi-
dence, will bring out any potential for racial prejudice. The
Supreme Court accepted this argument in Ristaino v. Ross.116
Ironically, however, the Court noted that there was no indication
from the record that all potential jurors in that case even knew
that the defendants were Black.117 Potential jurors, who have lit-
tle knowledge of the facts of the case and none of the legal experi-
ence necessary to predict possible trial tactics, should not be
expected to recognize that their biases may become relevant as the
case develops at trial.118
Perhaps the most significant problem with a severely limited
dictability because the jury's verdict is unlikely to be overturned The price for
that greater predictability is the strong possibility that some defendants are con-
victed partly on the basis of juror prejudice. Clearly that is too high a price to pay.
The practical effect of an appellate standard which gives less weight to the trial
judge's discretion is that judges would ask the racial bias question in any case
where there is a reasonable possibility that a racial element will come out at trial.
That is exactly the result which justice requires.
116. 424 U.S. 589, 592 n.4, 598 (1976).
117. Id. at 593 n.5.
118. In People v. Williams, 29 Cal. 3d 392, 628 P.2d 869, 174 Cal. Rptr. 317 (1981),
the California Supreme Court pointed to the facts of Donovan v. Davis, 558 F.2d 201
(4th Cir. 1977), as an illustration of jurors' inability to recognize and identify preju-
dice in response to a general question:
[Elven if a juror is aware that he holds a particular attitude or knows
of certain facts that would make it difficult for him to be evenhanded,
questions about his general ability to be fair may not bring them to
mind. Donovan v. Davis provides a striking example of the inability
of jurors to adequately assess their own potential for partiality in the
absence of inquiry focused on specific sources of bias. There, defend-
ant was charged with attempted rape. Seven of the jurors in that case
had also served on a jury that had tried defendant one week earlier on
the unrelated charge of unauthorized use of a motor vehicle. At the
earlier trial evidence was adduced that tended to portray defendant as
a "putative Don Juan," including references to wife "chasing" and var-
ious excursions with different women. Nonetheless, when asked
whether they would be influenced at the second trial by anything they
witnessed in the first, each of the jurors remained silent.
In reversing the conviction, Judge Winter of the Fourth Circuit
commented, "The voir dire was conducted before any evidence was
presented at the second trial and the members of that venire were not
told what issues the case would present. The members could quite
honestly remain silent in response to a question about whether they
would be influenced in arriving at a verdict at the second trial by what
they had previously heard-thereby indicating that they would not be
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voir dire is that potential jurors may not recognize that they hold
any prejudices at all.119
Our courts have become increasingly aware that bias often
deceives its host by distorting his view not only of the world
around him but also of himself. Hence although we must pre-
sume that a potential juror is responding in good faith when
he asserts broadly that he can judge the case impartially ...
further interrogation may reveal bias of which he is unaware
or which, because of his impaired objectivity, he unreasonably
believes he can overcome.120
Because jurors will not be stricken for cause unless there is a clear
indication that their bias will prevent them from rendering an im-
partial verdict,121 it is difficult to challenge potential jurors who
refuse to recognize their own prejudices or assert that they are
able to put them aside. As a practical matter, peremptory chal-
lenges are the best way to significantly limit racial prejudice in the
jury.122 Additional questions concerning racial bias are necessary
if defense counsel is to use peremptory challenges intelligently.123
Peremptory challenges were considered an important proce-
dural right under English common law, and the practice was ex-
plicitly adopted by the U.S. Congress.' 24 By 1870, most states had
followed suit. 1 25 Denial or impairment of the right to peremptory
challenges is reversible error even without a showing of preju-
affected-and yet be influenced when the attempted rape case was
submitted to them."
Id. at 400 n.3, 628 P.2d at 873 n.3, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 321 n.3 (citations omitted).
119. The comments to Standard 7 of the ABA Standards Relating to Juror Use
and Management specifically state that the purpose of voir dire is "to discover con-
scious or subconscious preconceptions and biases." Standards, supra note 11, at
Standard 7 commentary at 68.
At least one authority suggests that the accuracy of a person's estimation of his
own fairmindedness is likely to be inversely proportional to the depth of his actual
prejudices. Alfred Friendly & Ronald Goldfarb, Crime and Publicity 103 (1967),
cited in Williams, 29 Cal. 3d at 400 n.2, 628 P.2d at 873 n.2, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 321 n.2.
120. Williams, 29 Cal. 3d at 402, 628 P.2d at 873, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 321.
121. See supra note 3.
122. Id.
123. Rosales-Lopez v. United States, 451 U.S. 182, 188 (1980). See also Standards,
supra note 11, at Standard 7 commentary at 68.
124. See Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 212-15 (1965).
125. Id. at 215-16. For state cases affirming the notion that questioning directed
primarily toward the use of peremptory challenges is a proper function of voir dire,
see Shelby County v. Baker, 269 Ala. 111, 118, 110 So. 2d 896, 902 (1959); People v.
Williams, 29 Cal. 3d 392, 407, 628 P.2d 869, 877, 174 Cal. Rptr. 317, 323 (1981); Lamb
v. State, 241 Ga. 10, 12, 243 S.E.2d 59, 61 (1978); State v. Altergott, 57 Hawaii 492,
498, 559 P.2d 728, 733 (1977); Hart v. State, 265 Ind. 145, 151, 352 N.E.2d 712, 716
(1976); Gossett v. Commonwealth, 426 S.W.2d 485, 487 (Ky. 1968); People v. Harrell,
398 Mich. 384, 388, 247 N.W.2d 829, 830 (1976); State v. Anderson, 30 Ohio St. 2d 66,
71-72, 282 N.E.2d 568, 571 (1972); Wallis v. State, 546 S.W.2d 244, 249 (Tenn. Crim.
App. 1976); Emanus v. State, 526 S.W.2d 806, 808 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975).
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dice.12 6 In fact, the Supreme Court recognizes that the right to
peremptory challenges is "one of the most important of the rights
secured to the accused."127 Without an adequate voir dire, the de-
fendant cannot have the full benefit of the right to exercise per-
emptory challenges.128
Consequently, because of the difficulty of proving racial prej-
udice and because of the reluctance of potential jurors to recognize
and admit their own racial prejudices, peremptory challenges are
especially important in eliminating racial prejudices from the
jury's deliberations.
While challenges for cause permit rejection of jurors on a nar-
rowly specified, provable and legally cognizable basis of parti-
ality, the peremptory permits rejection for a real or imagined
partiality that is less easily designated or demonstrable. 129
Admittedly, no voir dire can be expected to eliminate all pos-
sibility of juror prejudice. Peremptory challenges are widely al-
lowed precisely because of the difficulty of exposing prejudice
where it seems to exist. Racial prejudice can be reduced simply by
taking the time to ask prospective jurors a few questions. Defense
counsel must have information concerning the jurors' racial
prejudices if he or she is to use peremptory challenges to insure
the greatest possible measure of fairness in the jury.130 Therefore,
it is imperative that potential jurors be questioned about racial
prejudice.
V. Conclusion and Recommendation
The Supreme Court correctly overturned Turner's sentence
and required that a trial judge grant a defense request that pro-
spective jurors be questioned about racial bias in any capital case
involving an interracial crime. Under the "special circumstances"
126. Swain, 380 U.S. at 219. Some commentators believe that peremptory chal-
lenges are the most important means of securing an impartial jury. David Suggs &
Bruce Sales, Juror Self-Disclosure in the Voir Dire: A Social Science Analysis, 56
Ind. L.J. 245, 246 (1981). Jurors are generally unwilling to admit prejudice. In those
cases where jurors do admit prejudice, they are usually unwilling to admit that
they are unable to put their prejudices aside and judge the case impartially. Id. See
also supra note 119 and accompanying text.
127. Swain, 380 U.S. at 219 (quoting Pointer v. United States, 151 U.S. 396, 408
(1893)). But see Batson v. Kentucky, 106 S. Ct. 1712, 1728-29 (1986) (Marshall, J.,
concurring).
128. Rosales-Lopez v. United States, 451 U.S. 182, 188 (1980).
129. Hayes v. Missouri, 120 U.S. 68, 70 (1886), cited in Swain, 380 U.S. at 220.
130. The American Bar Association Standards for Criminal Justice require that
voir dire be used to establish a basis for the intelligent use of peremptory chal-
lenges as well as establishing a basis for challenging for cause. Standards Relating
to Trial by Jury § 2.4 (1968).
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doctrine laid down by the Supreme Court in Ham v. South Caro-
lina and Ristaino v. Ross, the trial court was constitutionally re-
quired to grant defendant's request that prospective jurors be
questioned about racial bias. A capital murder case involving a
Black defendant and a white victim necessarily falls within the
Ristaino standard because it involves a "constitutionally signifi-
cant likelihood that, absent questioning about racial prejudice, the
jurors would not be as 'indifferent as [they stand] unsworn.' "131
The sentencing determination, a subjective decision by the jury
based in large part on its estimation of the moral worth of the de-
fendant and of the degree of retribution befitting the specific act
against this specific victim, is likely to bring any latent racial bias
to the surface of the jury's deliberations. Courts bear a special re-
sponsibility to protect a defendant's right to due process in a capi-
tal case, where society takes on the awesome responsibility of
deciding whether to take the life of a fellow human being.
The Supreme Court erred when it reaffirmed Ristaino and
refused to overturn Turner's conviction. The Court should dis-
pense with the Ristaino "special circumstances" doctrine and re-
place it with a per se rule requiring that trial judges grant a
defense request that potential jurors be questioned about racial
bias in any case involving an allegation of a violent crime by a mi-
nority defendant against a white victim. The Court has already
laid down such a per se rule for federal trial courts under its fed-
eral supervisory power.132 There is no good reason why the Court
should not extend that requirement to state courts under the four-
teenth amendment. 133 The rule would foster both the appearance
and reality of fundamental fairness in our criminal justice system,
and would require very little sacrifice of courtroom efficiency.
131. See Ristaino v. Ross, 424 U.S. 589, 596 (1976) (citing Coke on Littleton 155b
(19th ed. 1832)).
132. See Rosales-Lopez, 451 U.S. at 192.
133. The Court expressed concern in Ristaino that such a requirement could not
logically be restricted to racial prejudice, but would apply with equal force to bias
based on national or ethnic origin or on religious affiliation. Ristaino, 424 U.S. at
596 n.8. In fact, the Court was correct. The Court addressed that concern in
Rosales-Lopez:
[S]ince the courts are seeking to assure the appearance and reality of a
fair trial, if the defendant claims a meaningful ethnic difference be-
tween himself and the victim, his voir dire request should ordinarily
be satisfied.
451 U.S. at 191 n.7.
Even when there are no "special circumstances" connected with an al-
leged criminal transaction indicating an unusual risk of racial or other
group bias, a member of the Nazi Party should not be allowed to sit in
judgment on a Jewish defendant.
Id. at 197 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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Trial courts do not "inject" racial prejudice into a trial by question-
ing jurors about their racial biases any more than they "inject" the
notion that all defendants are guilty when they question jurors on
the presumption of innocence. The court can effectively perform
its basic function-an objective determination of the case based
solely on the merits-only if it directly accepts responsibility for
protecting minority defendants from possible racial prejudice
among jurors.
